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C orporations and unions face very different rules and requirements for their political spending. Labor unions must publicly disclose their political spending and, in 
some instances, face restrictions about seeking 
consent from their stakeholders before using 
political funds. Corporations do not face the 
same requirements. After Citizens United, there 
are many avenues through which corporations 
can spend money in politics without disclosing 
their financial support for particular candidates or 
causes. And corporations are not required to seek 
approval from their stakeholders—in fact, share-
holders don’t even have the right under federal law 
to know if and how a company is spending money 
in politics.
This paper highlights the differences and broad 
implications of rules governing political spending 
by corporations and unions. It recommends Con-
gress adopt a comprehensive disclosure regime 
like the DISCLOSE Act and the SEC meet its 
responsibility to update disclosure laws for cor-
porate political spending in the wake of Citizens 
United.
Do Corporations & Unions
Face the Same Rules
for Political Spending?
Federal rules 
require unions to 
publicly disclose all 
political spending.... 
Corporations are 
under no similar 
blanket federal 
obligation to disclose 
their use of corporate 
resources for 
political purposes.”
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How did Citizens United v. FEC change the landscape
for corporate and union political spending?
In Citizens United v. FEC1 the Supreme Court struck down the 
law prohibiting corporations and unions from spending money 
from their general funds to influence federal elections through 
independent expenditures or electioneering communications.2 
Previously, they could use money given voluntarily from their 
members and employees to their political action committees for 
political spending. The resources available to corporations from 
their general funds for such political spending are vastly greater 
than those available to unions. The total revenue for all labor 
unions in 2013 (a tax category that includes agricultural and hor-
ticultural organizations) was $20.8 billion,3 while total corporate 
profits in just the 4th Quarter of 2013 was $1.9 trillion.4
Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion assumes this new 
political spending would be transparent and accountable, writ-
ing “disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to react to the 
speech of corporate entities in a proper way.”5 The opinion argues 
disclosure would be, “more effective” today because modern 
technology could make disclosure “rapid and informative.”6
Secret political spending has increased exponentially since 
Citizens United, exactly the opposite of what the Court’s majority 
posits when they rely on the presumption of transparency and 
accountability to reach their decision. Citizens United was de-
cided in 2010, and by 2011 a study by the Center for Responsive 
Politics already found that “the percentage of spending coming 
from groups that do not disclose their donors has risen from 1 
percent to 47 percent since the 2006 midterm elections.”7
Because, though the game has changed, the rules have not 
kept up. The rules that govern disclosure of political spending by 
unions were in place before Citizens United, but federal disclo-
sure rules have not been updated to cover the new corporate po-
litical spending allowed by Citizens United. Federal rules require 
unions to publicly disclose all political spending and itemize 
payments over $5,000 with the date, name and address of the 
recipient, and purpose of the payment.8 Critically, this includes 
spending done through third party groups.
Corporations are under no similar blanket federal obligation 
to disclose their use of corporate resources for political purposes. 
They do not have to disclose political funds they route the money 
through other groups such as 501(c)(4) “social welfare” groups 
and 501(c)(6) business associations – and these tax exempt non-
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profit groups also are not required to disclose the source of their 
funds. 
Before Citizens United these dark money groups were not per-
mitted to spend directly on federal elections,9 but now political 
spending by political nonprofits and business associations dwarfs 
spending by 501(c)(5) unions, which do have to disclose:
Figure 1. 501 (c) Spending, Cycle Totals, by Type
Source: Center for Responsive Politics, “Outside Spending by Disclosure, Excluding Party Committees,” June 4, 2014.10  
Without knowing the identities of the sources of the funds, 
it’s impossible to know how much of the $300 million dollars in 
dark money spent in the 2012 elections from organized busi-
ness associations and newly politically active “social welfare” 
groups came from corporations, let alone which corporations. 
For example, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce spent $69,506,784 
on elections in 2010 and 2012, without identifying the source of 
those funds,11 and was the biggest outside spender in the 2010 
elections.12
Indications are that secret political money will only continue 
to rise until the rules are changed. At this point in July in the 
2012 election cycle, dark money was already at an all-time high 
compared to the same point at any prior cycle—at about $11 mil-
lion it was a three-fold increase over the 2008 presidential elec-
tion.13 Already so far in the 2014 election cycle more than $34.6 
million has been spent by organizations that do not identify the 
sources of their funds. This is three times the amount of dark 
money spent at this point in the 2012 presidential election and a 
shocking fifteen times more than was spent in dark money at this 
point in the last midterm elections in 2010.14
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Moreover, most outside spending comes in a flurry in the last 
month of the election. In 2012, $184 million of dark money was 
spent on or after October 1st,15 which represents over sixty per-
cent of the secret political spending tracked in that year. If these 
trends hold dark money totals this year will certainly break the 
2010 midterm record and may even surpass the 2012 presidential 
election. As it currently stands, we will have no way of knowing 
the real identities of the political players funding these groups or 
how much money is coming from corporate sources.
Are unions and corporations subject to the same transparency
requirements for their political spending?
No. Both unions and corporations have to report to the Fed-
eral Election Commission any political expenditures made to 
finance independent expenditures and electioneering commu-
nications. However, this covers only some of the direct political 
spending. Otherwise, the regulations governing corporate and 
union political spending are very different, and allow much more 
secrecy for corporations than for unions.16
Table 1: Political Disclosure Requirements for Unions
and Corporations
Unions Corporations
What is required
to be disclosed? 
All “direct and indirect” 
disbursements to all 
entities associated with 
political spending at the 
federal, state or local level, 
for either a candidate or a 
ballot issue
Only ads purchased directly with 
corporate funds that explicitly 
support or oppose a candidate for 
federal office or meet the definition of 
an electioneering communication
Frequency Every year No federal requirement, varies by state
Consequences
for Failure
False reporting or failure 
to report can result in 
enforcement action or liti-
gation, as well as possible 
criminal penalties
No federal requirement, 
varies by state
Public Availability
All disclosures must be 
made available to the 
public and are available 
online.
No federal requirement
Stakeholder
Knowledge
& Consent
Union nonmembers may 
receive a pro rata refund 
of political spending if they 
wish; certain instances 
require a union to receive 
consent prior to spending.
Shareholders have no right to know 
of corporate spending 
or redress for spending they
disagree with
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The rules requiring disclosure of union political spending are 
comprehensive and apply to every union with total annual re-
ceipts of $250,000 or more. Federal law requires that unions dis-
close to the Department of Labor “direct and indirect disburse-
ments to all entities and individuals . . . associated with political 
disbursements or contributions in money.”17 These LM-2 reports 
are available on the Department of Labor’s website.
Unions are required to report the money they spend not just 
in federal candidate elections, but also for state and local office, 
including judicial races. They are explicitly required to be trans-
parent about spending to support or oppose ballot referenda or 
to influence legislation. In addition, they are required to report 
get-out-the-vote campaigns, voter education campaigns, fund-
raising and any politically-related litigation expenses. Crucially, 
their donations to 501(c)(4) groups, unlike the similar donations 
by corporations, must be disclosed on the Schedule 17 form.18
In stark contrast, the only agency to which corporations are 
required to report their indirect political spending is the Inter-
nal Revenue Service, and those reports are not made public. If 
corporations directly engage in political spending, they must 
disclose their independent expenditures and electioneering com-
munications to the Federal Election Commission 19 But they can 
funnel as much dark money as they would like through 501(c) 
groups. Corporations may voluntarily disclose these contribu-
tions, but face no requirement to do so. Of the 100 companies 
that have chosen to make voluntary disclosures—a micro-frac-
tion of all corporations—many disclose donation amounts, but 
not the destination of the money, disclose selectively and/or 
disclose in an untimely fashion.20
State disclosure laws are a patchwork and too often ineffective. 
But after Citizens United several states passed laws to strengthen 
their disclosure requirements for corporate political spending 
in state elections. For example, Maryland passed a law requir-
ing companies that spend money to influence state elections to 
report the spending to their shareholders.21
Are unions and corporations subject to the same accountability 
requirements for political spending?
No. For unions, nonmember workers that benefit from a 
union contract are able to request a refund of the portion of their 
fees that went to political activities,22 and in some instances the 
Supreme Court has required public sector unions to receive prior 
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consent before assessing fees for political spending.23 
Corporations are not required to get consent from their share-
holders before the corporation uses corporate funds to support 
or oppose political candidates.24 Shareholders have no ability to 
approve or dissent from a corporation’s political spending, or 
receive a pro rata refund for spending with which they disagree. 
In the United Kingdom, shareholders vote on a political budget 
for the company;25 legislation has been introduced in the United 
States that would require shareholder approval for corporate 
political spending.26
In the U.S., shareholders don’t even have the right to know 
how a corporation is spending money in politics. Shareholders 
have no way to know whether the corporations they are invest-
ed in are engaging in political spending, and what they may be 
supporting without their knowledge. While problematic for a 
number of reasons, this is most notable for failing to provide the 
accountability the Supreme Court assumed would be present 
when it struck down the ban on corporate political spending in 
Citizens United. Justice Kennedy explicitly wrote that with the 
advent of the internet, prompt disclosure “can provide sharehold-
ers and citizens with the information needed to hold corpora-
tions and elected officials accountable.”27 But this accountability 
to shareholders doesn’t exist. In fact, many companies don’t yet 
have policies requiring that their boards of directors approve 
political spending by the corporation they control. 
This disparate treatment makes even less sense after consider-
ing that labor unions represent millions of workers collectively 
pooling their money to represent their interests and strengthen 
their voices, whereas business corporations are economic entities 
created to make profits and avoid liabilities.28 
What are the implications of the different rules for political 
spending by corporations and unions?
In his book, Affluence and Influence, political scientist Martin 
Gilens looked at how closely the publicly declared preferenc-
es of various interest groups align with the policy preferences 
expressed by Americans.29 He found that policy preferences 
expressed by unions are aligned with the interests of Americans 
across the income spectrum.
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Figure 2: Policy Preferences of Unions and Americans
Source: Martin Gilens, Affluence and Influence (2012)
Unions advocate for the positions more closely aligned with 
the preferences of working people, average-earning middle class 
Americans, and the relatively affluent (those in the 90th percen-
tile for income). Gilens writes, “based on unions’ strong ten-
dency to share the preferences of the less well-off and the large 
number of policy areas they are engaged in . . ., unions would 
appear to be among the most promising interest group bases for 
strengthening the policy influence of America’s poor and middle 
class.”30
His work also shows that organized business interests are 
among those least aligned with popular opinion.
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Source: Martin Gilens, Affluence and Influence (2012)
Political spending by unions even aligns more closely with the 
interests of shareholders than that of the profiled businesses and trade 
associations. After all, most of the shares of public companies are 
ultimately held by the general public through intermediaries, such as 
institutional investors charged with managing retirement accounts.
But our campaign finance and other laws and regulations, shaped 
by Supreme Court decisions, require that unions comply with many 
more transparency and accountability measures than corporations 
when they engage in political spending. Corporations are able to wield 
power through political spending without complying with the same 
disclosure or consent provisions that apply to unions. This is another 
way in which our current system stacks the deck in favor of the elite.31
What can be done to address the different requirements
governing political spending by corporations and unions?
On the heels of Citizens United, Congress came within one vote of 
overcoming a party-line filibuster to pass the DISCLOSE Act. The need 
for improved transparency has only grown more clear, and Congress 
should adopt comprehensive legislation to require disclosure of the 
true source of funds used for political spending. Voters have a right 
to know who is influencing their votes and currying favor with their 
representatives.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has a responsibility to 
respond to these specific changed conditions by issuing a rule re-
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quiring publicly traded corporations to disclose their political 
spending to their shareholders. This is part of the SEC’s core 
mission to protect shareholders and the integrity of the markets. 
Under Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the 
SEC may require proxy disclosures as “necessary or appropriate 
in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”32 There 
are important investor interests implicated in political spending, 
e.g., management agency issues, alignments between values, and 
risk to brand and shareholder value.33 Shareholders have a right 
to know how a public corporation is spending money, and they 
need to know in order to make informed investment decisions.
Many companies are facing shareholder demands for in-
creased transparency around corporate political spending. It 
was the most frequently filed shareholder resolution in 2014 and 
2013.34 Over 100 companies have entered into agreements with 
their shareholders to disclose certain elements of their political 
spending.35 And yet voluntary disclosure agreements can be 
difficult to enforce. For example, Aetna gave $7 million to two 
501(c)(4) groups in 2012 but didn’t disclose their contributions 
even though they had a disclosure agreement with their share-
holders.36
Leading investors are demanding a systemic solution. John 
Bogle, founder and former CEO of Vanguard has called for 
greater regulation of corporate political spending, saying “it’s 
time to stand up to the Supreme Court’s misguided decision; to 
bring democracy to corporate governance; to recognize the inter-
locking interests of our corporate and financial systems; and take 
that first step along the road to reducing the dominant role that 
big money plays in our political system.”37
Conclusion
Unions and corporations face very different regulations when 
it comes to their political activity. Unions are heavily regulat-
ed and are required to report any political spending to several 
federal agencies, including the IRS and the Department of Labor. 
Corporations are required to disclose only a part of their polit-
ical spending and face no accountability even from their own 
stakeholders. While organized business is free to advocate for the 
policies they prefer, it is only fair that they do so with at least the 
same transparency and accountability rules that govern orga-
nized labor.l
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